Scholars and laymen today ponder the tangles of federal deregulation and weigh its effects, positive or negative, on aviation, banking, and the telephone. Two years after Congress opted for deregulation of aviation, the Harvard Business School held a conference on the various approaches to the history of governmental regulation in the United States. This book resulted from the revisions of five of the conference papers and includes an excellent conclusion which covers the entire conference program. The collection presents the interesting assessments of four historians and a political scientist who examine selected aspects of regulation history, generally beginning with the Progressive Era.
Thomas McCraw uses a new model vocabulary to survey early American business. He acknowledges the crucial role of leading business historians and the newer tools of economics as a discipline. He describes the complexities of large growing combinations, why they persisted, and why other trusts failed. The belief that all trusts were evil and unnatural could not survive modern scrutiny. Louis D. Brandeis, a liberal hero of the antitrust movement, was blind to the advantages of trusts and the more important basic needs of his favorite small businesses because he abhorred modern advertising and materialism. He wasted his time by attempting to compare American trusts unfavorably with European cartels and by battling pricefixing.
Morton Keller discusses the European traditions of regulation which America inherited in the late nineteenth century. In America, the national mood included a deep suspicion of central government which, after 1900, became a tremendous zeal to control the size of industry. Keller denies the New Left charge that entrepreneurs contrived to gain controls which they could manipulate to their own advantage. He sees a variety of constituents and goals which resulted in further regulation. Keller cites the ambiguities of early Supreme Court decisions in cases of business regulation as examples of how complex the government-business relationship has been. By 1914, one inevitability of this relationship was clear: greater governmental controls went hand-in-hand with large private enterprise. Nevertheless, by the Great Depression, few effective models of economic control had emerged except for World War I emergency regulations. Yet after several decades of slumber, a new movement against large corporations appeared in the 1960s and 1970s, and again faced uncertain reception from the courts and populace.
Ellis Hawley explores three industries-lumber, aviation, and the movies-which exhibited Herbert Hoover's associationalism from 1921 to 1930. All three attempted to establish their own groups to monitor their industries and to manipulate the regulators. Foresters wanted to police reckless lumbermen themselves but the United States Forest Service took over the control process. The infant aviation industry was determined to establish its own reasonable administration law with which to govern itself and avoid adversarial proceedings. The system did not untangle market conditions and economic prospects for that industry, however. The Hays Office, a quasi-governmental body which watched the movies, was less successful, despite its persistent maintainence of a code for producers.
Samuel P. Hays analyzes political choices which have involved regulation. Hays attacks numerous old myths. For example, many businesses were also consumers and did not view all regulation from the same perspective as did other businesses. The entire political process existed in the major context of a struggle among business, labor, and agriculture to affect regulation. Regulators have been subject to change; for example, since 1960 federal conservation officials have relied on the expertise of scientists and planners. Also, while from 1870 to 1940 Americans emphasized competition among producers as the basis for regulation, since World War II organized consumer groups have invaded the debate over proper regulation.
Political scientist David Vogel stresses the "new" social regulation in the appropriate historical background, which includes the earlier Progressive Era and the New Deal. Before the 1960s, social regulation remained primarily under state and local control; since then a number of federal entities interfered to assure regulation and assist the consumer in a true public-interest movement. Business has risen recently to defend itself and to lobby against this new social regulation. Legal delays have thus slowed the regulatory process.
The contributors to this volume have thoughtfully and concisely raised pertinent issues in the debate over theoretical approaches to governmental regulation. By design, they direct little attention to the daily operations, successes, or failures of the many federal regulatory agencies. They also make a few minor errors: one author mistakenly describes the National Transportation Safety Board as entirely new -in function even though several predecessor agencies performed the identical functions, and the groundswell for deregulation in the midseventies was more bipartisan than the authors contend. These minor flaws, however, in no way detract from the usefulness of this addition to the growing literature on regulation. 
